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To address the subject of democracy as a hegemonic political discourse implies 
a question that guided this writing, a question that might sound naïve during 
these times of social conflict and economic polarization, and enunciated by 
Lenin back in 1917: “But, how to justify the deception, the fooling of the people, 
the violation of the will of the overwhelming majority of the population?” (Lenin 
in Zizek, 2002: 28).
Bearing in mind the subject of ideology, I will address the issue of democ-
racy from a perspective that tends to identify the ways in which democracy 
actually functions as a social relation into social reality. I argue that the ideology 
of democracy results from the constitutive distance existing between an installed 
hegemonic democratic discourse and the current democratic practice, and that 
both instances acquire an ideological reality in what I defined as democratic func-
tioning. From this viewpoint I argue that the ideological efficiency of democracy lies 
in the possibility of controlling the political potential of society, and in that sense, 
critique needs to address and revitalize politics as the possibility of change.
In this sense, democracy can be understood as a hegemonic concept/
discourse, as a primary significant organizing a given discourse, as the ideo-
logical key serving as a point de capiton, in the lacanian sense of organizer of 
a discourse always well ordered, audible: hegemonic.
The discourse of democracy has installed a logic that imposes a concept 
and makes it circulate despite the possibility of its accomplishment.
Since the end of the Cold War, to speak about democracy is to speak 
about liberal democracy, with little if not any dispute concerning the validity of 
this system of government. In any case, it is not my intention to discuss the 
validity of liberal democracy in terms of its formal mechanisms (system of elec-
tion, representation, etc), but in terms of its actual ideological functioning as a 
hegemonic political discourse and practice. Once the Cold War was finished, 
the hegemony of the liberal project became incontestable; it meant straight 
away the triumph of the rule of market in a global level. As Wallerstein describes 
it: “Capitalism and the modern state- system were not two separate historical 
inventions (or conceptions) that had to be fitted together or articulated with each 
other. They were obverse sides of a single coin, they were both part of a seam-
less whole. Neither is imaginable without the other. They were simultaneously 
developed, and neither could continue to exist without the other” (Wallerstein 
in Smith et al., 1996).
I understand discourse in a Foucaultian perspective as “the totalities within 
which any productions of meanings take place” (Laclau on Foucault in Goodin 
et al., 1995). This implies discourse as the instance of social production and 
re-production of meanings. 
When I speak of democratic discourse I mean the ways in which de-
mocracy is produced as a social meaning, and therefore reproduced as social 
La certidumbre de que todo está escrito 
nos anula o nos afantasma
[Jorge Luis Borges]
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reality. That is to say, the way in which political practices are imprinted in a set 
of ideas which are, at the same time, a result of these practices as well as their 
ideological support
From a Gramscian perspective, hegemony can be understood “as the 
organisation of consent -the processes through which subordinated forms 
of consciousness are constructed without recourse to violence or coercion.” 
(Barret in Zizek, 2000: 239). In order to achieve consent without recourse to 
-explicit- violence or coercion, hegemony within democratic discourse implies 
certain legitimacy, justified by the display of a whole set of concepts such as 
freedom of choice, freedom of speech, representation and so on, that acquire 
consistence in the rule of law.
The hegemony of discourse on democracy entails the privilege and circula-
tion of concepts that tend to be normative as well as prescriptive. In a political 
sense, this implies the production of social meanings and values that legitimate 
a given political order, for they exhaust the political possibilities required to attain 
change. The political entitlement of the democratic discourse is based on a whole 
system of legitimation that presents itself - to a greater or lesser extent- as lying on 
the society’s will or, at least, on its benefit. As Drizek1 presents it: “Because dis-
courses are social as well as personal, they act as sources of order by coordinating 
the behaviour of the individuals who subscribe to them” (Dryzek, 1999: 34).
Within the democratic discourse, hegemony implies legitimacy as a le-
gal correlate. As a matter of fact, democracy requires a legal framework that 
organizes its practice and that is imbued with democratic meanings, such as 
‘representation’, ‘equality’ and ‘legality’. Hegemony is exercised through these 
constituents of legitimacy, since, as it has been stated before, the political pos-
sibilities of change or contestation are subject to a pre-existing legal framework 
imposed by democracy as the only chance to deal with social reality. This op-
eration implies the assessment that the current social order is the only possible 
one, and that its defects are going to be corrected only within its frames.
In this sense it can be argued that the accumulation of economic power 
cannot be detached from the accumulation of political power and that the rela-
tion between these two forces needs to be cooperative, so that one serves to 
the purposes of the other.
Independently of the whole range of democracies deployed in the ex-
panded western world, democracy has been set to be understood as a desirable 
political goal and as a liberal attainment.
Since economic-political liberalism is a hegemonic power, the amplitude 
of possibilities conveyed by the very historical development of the concept of 
democracy has been limited to a prescriptive rule of law. In every case, de-
mocracy is understood as liberal democracy, or it is disavowed as democracy. 
As David Held affirms: “democracy bestows an aura of legitimacy on modern 
political life: laws, rules and policies appear justified when they are ‘democratic’. 
But it was not always so” (Held, 1995:3). Held explains that democracy has 
evolved along the conformation of the nation state, and even though democracy, 
as a political concept, has suffered several changes across time and space, 
the contemporary hegemony of the concept of democracy is related to the 
hegemony of the modern state that implies capitalist expansion, efficient war 
waging and legitimacy.
The capitalist necessity of expansion can be resumed in the concept of 
globalization as the stretching of economical relation across the globe. This pro-
1 I do not follow Dryzek in considering that a discursive change will allow a political change, but 
instead that political change is the result of the operationalization of the contradictions that 
animate a given hegemonic discourse, of the desestabilization of any hegemonic discourse.
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cess entails democracy as the privileged political discourse of globalization, and 
it can be related, in turn, to the fact that democracy has installed the paradigm of 
diversity as a central political issue. But this paradigm, while representing itself 
multifariously and plural, leaves untouched the core centre of capitalist produc-
tion, where the unity of the whole process lies. That is to say, the accumulation 
of capital, whose political counterpart is the accumulation of power. 
Classically (and briefly), the logic of accumulation that rules capitalism 
implies the social production of surplus value appropriated by the owner of 
the means of production, in detriment of the producers, the owners of the la-
bor force. Likewise, this can be stated when it comes to the way in which the 
world system actually operates. As Wallerstein explains, there is a relationship 
of core-periphery that despite being mostly relational can be -to a certain ex-
tent- geographically visualized, implying the transfer of surplus value from the 
periphery to the core, in every different level of the capitalist chain of production 
and reproducing, too, the same relationship. “A core periphery relation is the 
relation between the more monopolized sectors of production on the one hand 
and the more competitive on the other, and therefore the relation between high 
-profit (and generally high-wage) and low profit (low wage) production activities. 
[…] Coreness and peripherality, being relational, are not necessarily or always 
geographically separated. The two kinds of activity may well coexist within the 
same square mile. But there are a number of good reasons why, in practice, there 
has tended to be a high degree of spatial segregation, with a heavy concentra-
tion of core activities in a few places, with others housing primarily peripheral 
activities” (Wallerstein in Smith et al. 1996: 88).
Regarding democracy, the logic of accumulation of capital is translated 
into the accumulation of power. Likewise, democracy recognizes core and pe-
ripheral areas that acquire different denominations, first-third world, developed-
developing countries, high and low intensity democracies and so on. 
The expansion of capitalism in its need of consumption has turned almost 
every sphere of life into a commodity. Under the rule of capitalism, everything 
is susceptible of being integrated into the logic of circulation of commodities 
and in their own logic of exchange implying, in the last instance, accumulation 
as the result of the logic that conducts the whole process. 
The end of the Cold War opened up the markets and the circulation of 
commodities became global, hiding and forgetting -globally- the very foundations 
of the current order. Actually this can be understood considering that financial 
capital produces nothing; therefore, it is fundamental that it should circulate in 
order to acquire surplus value in this circulation mechanism. In this sense it can 
be argued that the mechanism of accumulation and exclusion that dominates 
and sustains the capitalist mode of production has its political correlate in the 
liberal democratic discourse, since democratic discourse is valued and pre-
sented as the only legitimate political discourse resulting from the assessment 
of an ideological operation that detaches it from its historical conditions and 
development, as well as from its performing into reality.
I speak about democratic discourse by understanding that it is possible 
to distinguish -analytically- two levels to conform social reality. There is a level 
of enunciation, a justificatory discourse of the system, and there is the level of 
the performance of this discourse into social reality. The way they co-operate 
is one where the discourse allows only certain practice, and at the same time, 
this only practice reinforces the enunciation that justifies it. It is in this interaction 
where the ideological operation takes place.
In this era of neoliberal hegemony, the democratic paradigm operates 
ideologically overshadowing its inherent contradictions and exhausting the 
political capital, which in turn implies an accumulation of power for one side in 
detriment of others. In this process, whatever might appear as a malfunctioning 
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of democracy is in fact constitutive of the democratic functioning as a contem-
porary power strategy.
As Marx has already stated, the labor force was “liberated” in such a 
way that there was no other option but to integrate the market (Marx, 1976). In 
my opinion, there is a similar situation with democracy. I would argue that in a 
global scale, societies have been democratized for the same reason that labor 
force was liberated, that is, as a process of accumulation of power in which 
what remains obscure is the political fact of the alienation of political power: in 
other words, the process behind the appearance that the democratic discourse 
installs; that is to say, the contradictions that determine the political possibilities 
of every concrete social situation. Therefore, within democratic discourse the 
democratic function is alienated from its historical determinants.
Susan Marks (2000) in her book The Riddle of all Constitutions addresses 
the relationship between democracy and ideology. She defines ideology as “the 
ways in which meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination”, 
a conception developed from John Thompson’s critical perspective, that em-
phasizes the power relations within the sphere of representation, a perspective 
very close to the Althusserian one, where what matters is the imaginary relation-
ship of individuals to their material conditions of existence, in the sense that it 
reproduces social structures.
This conception of ideology is drawn from Marx writings on the mystifica-
tion process. From this perspective, ideology is understood as a mechanism 
engaged in the production of social reality at the level of the production of 
meanings that “serves thereby to bolster up individuals and groups who occupy 
positions of power” (Thompson, 1990: 56).
These ideological operations can be understood within the theoretical 
framework of the fetishism of commodities as a theoretical model. I argue that 
a kind of fetishism of democracy can be identified within social reality, where 
the value attributed to the democratic discourse appears as a natural value, 
detached from its historical and political determinants, and detached from the 
use value of the democratic discourse. The use value of democratic discourse 
would lie in democratic practice, while its exchange value would lie in the demo-
cratic discourse, understood as how certain meanings are imposed on social 
reality, in an imaginary dimension. 
What has been said before defines the ideology of democracy as the 
system whereby certain meanings establish a discourse into social reality that 
operates reproducing a given state of things, that is, relations of domination. 
This discourse is the democratic discourse as a contemporary hegemonic 
political discourse.
Democratic discourse has its counterpart in democratic practice, and the 
ideology of democracy is played in the gap that simultaneously reunites and 
separates both levels, which I define as the democratic functioning.
The democratic functioning is the actual democratic practice pervaded 
by democratic discourse.
The democratic discourse installs a social imaginary of what democracy 
is. This social imaginary can be understood as the meanings that society places 
on the concept of democracy. The democratic imaginary implies the sphere of 
production of social meanings related to the democracy concept. It assumes the 
way in which the individuals identify democracy as a valuable political discourse, 
despite the structural historical determinants of the non-democratic situations 
that actually shape social reality. Therefore, the political possibilities implied in 
the democratic discourse are not being exercised but delayed and retained in 
the spectral appearance of the democratic discourse. As Pierre Jean Josue 
puts it: “It is not difficult to understand up to what extent such an idea makes 
the market prevail against politics. The hegemonic logic is now conceived as 
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a pursue (if not a pure and simple substitution) of politics by the economy. The 
power of seduction of this neoliberal ideology is essentially based on the attempt 
to supplant politics in its own field, accomplishing by other means the promise 
of a global justice” (Latinité et identité haitienne, 2005: 279). 
On the other hand, the democratic practice is the way in which the demo-
cratic discourse acquires social reality, that is to say, the way democracy actually 
works. The democratic practice belongs to the sphere of the way whereby mean-
ings acquire social expression, the way in which they exist, their real possibilities, 
or, to put it in almost classical words, their material conditions of existence. From 
this standpoint, it becomes necessary to rescue some concepts from the hege-
mony of neoliberalism. In that sense, it is important to distinguish the expression 
of a concept from its logic. Politics must be revived as well as consciousness, 
because a discourse is installed as hegemonic and therefore, it exhausts its 
contents, its meanings. The ideological effect of the above mentioned can be 
seen as the primacy of a meaning that has not been placed in social reality, or 
that cannot be placed. The very possibility of undertaking the content of a given 
hegemonic concept is disavowed by its circulation as hegemonic discourse.
The relationship between practice and discourse within the hegemonic 
democracy is a relation of reflection. It is in the intersection of these two levels, in 
what I have called the democratic function, which the essence of ideology, that 
is to say, the reproduction of the relations of domination, lays. Ideology implies 
the hegemony of certain meanings that appear as the expression of social reality. 
There is a social reality that appears as the reflection of the democratic discourse; 
therefore, it places democratic discourse at the level of reality, whereas the fact 
of domination is what is being put aside in this operation. Marx himself puts 
this operation in terms of reflection: “Such expressions of relations in general, 
called by Hegel reflex-categories, form a very curious class. For instance, one 
man is king only because other men stand in the relation of subjects to him. 
They, on the contrary, imagine that they are subjects because he is the king” 
(Marx in Zizek, 2000: 309). 
This implies that it is in the functioning of democratic discourse as a 
practice that social reality is produced and sustained, because of the existing 
correlate between the imaginary field of meanings and the symbolic field of 
practice. The practice perceives itself as reflecting the discursive conditions, 
while it reproduces the social structure and consequently, the distance sepa-
rating the reality of practice from the promises of discourse, reinforcing, thus, 
the relations of domination. As Susan Marks puts it, when referring to Zizek’s 
viewpoint, ideology lies in “the imaginary resolution of social cleavages, the re-
pression of social conflict” (Marks, 2000: 20). This means that the conflict that 
sustains a given social order is put beyond any question by being integrated to 
the symbolic frame of reality.
It is in any case the persistence of the relations of domination that are the 
stakes of the ideological operation. In the case of democracy, I argue that this 
task is accomplished by setting the limits of the political under the rule of law, 
prescribing the political limits and at the same time presenting these limits as 
natural, exhausting, accordingly, what is supposed to be the wide panoply of 
political choices.
As Zizek observes, very sharply: “Fidelity to the democratic consensus” 
means the acceptance of the present liberal-parliamentary consensus, which 
precludes any serious questioning of the way this liberal-democratic order is 
complicit in the phenomena it officially condemns, and of course, any serious 
attempt to imagine a different socio-political order” (Zizek, 2002: 167).
The type of democracy that rules a country varies according to the inter-
national division of labor and also goes along with the relations of hegemony 
between the different states. From this standpoint, it is self evident that the 
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states that occupy privileged places in the economic distribution of power, also 
have the highest performances in the democratic functioning scale. By con-
trast, those countries or states, which struggle within the last positions in the 
distribution of political economy, endure democratic regimes that are reduced 
to mere formal mechanisms such as elections, constitutional order, et cetera. 
This reduction is not due to an early stage of democratic development but to the 
result of the monopolization of power; it is hegemony, in the sense of political 
consent that sustains relations of domination what becomes the kernel of the 
globalised democratic discourse. Democracy has been globalised as a way of 
exercising control over the political forces of the emerging economies across 
the globe. For Professor Prabhat Patnaik “the caprices of international finance 
capital therefore find spontaneous expression in the policies being imposed all 
over the world by the leading capitalist economy of our time. This action of the 
latter on the other hand is not a whimsical or capricious one. It is to preserve 
the value of the wealth of a vast number of wealth holders” (Patnaik, 2005).
The paradox of the so called low intensity democracies lies in the existing 
gap between democracy, as a political discourse, and the critical social situation 
of the countries subjected to it. Such disruption becomes salient, nowadays, 
with the ever-increasing use of violence and force as mechanisms for keeping 
the safety of democracy. This shows that, when hegemony loses its balance, 
force and violence appear as the very foundations of the political, democratic 
order (e.g. the case of Iraq). As Cristovam Buarque expressed it: “One should 
not tolerate the barbarity of a world that produces US$ 40 trillion per year and 
has created a universal communication system, through which one may watch 
the death of millions of children due to starvation, as well as children labor due to 
their parent´ s poverty; and does not prepare their children to face the challenge 
to understand and change the world” (Cristovam Buarque, 2005: 335).
This implies that the democratic discourse reproduces its effectiveness at 
a global scale; the globalisation of the democratic discourse affords the great-
est opportunity for financial capitalism to develop. If there is a link between 
democracy and capitalism, it lies precisely in the privileged way that democratic 
discourse offers to the development of capitalism, because they both assume 
the task of regulating the monopolization of capital and, consequentially, of 
power under the rule of consent. The so-called low intensity democracies 
must be understood under this logic of the accumulation of power. They are 
the political possibilities of struggle against a given state of affairs, kept under 
control with the maintenance of these low intensity democracies. Democratic 
discourse is therefore installed as a concession, as if it implied taking into ac-
count the differences and the promotion of universal values such as equality, 
freedom, etc.; and at the same time, setting the framework for the assessment 
of these concessions.
The economical alienation means straightforward political alienation as an 
ideological necessity that, in contemporary democratic societies, takes the form 
of the impossibility to question the given political order. The hegemony of demo-
cratic discourse is, therefore, set in its ideological function because the ideology 
of democracy lies, precisely, in the circulation and installation of the democratic 
discourse and in the social meanings conveyed by this discourse despite the 
actual existence of democracy. In what can be identified as an ideological move-
ment, these social meanings are detached from their real applications, from 
the way they develop in social reality; that is to say, they are detached from the 
way in which these social meanings acquire symbolic efficacy and reproduce 
themselves, sheltered in the imaginary promises of the democratic discourse. 
Even if these promises are only about possibilities, it is the exhaustion that the 
prescription of these- though not others -possibilities conveys what defines the 
ideological efficacy at the level of the social practices. 
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Thus, social practice is framed by certain hegemonic meanings that forge 
into reality. In liberal democracies these meanings are supported by a legal 
framework that exhausts the possibilities of any practice, therefore disallowing 
political practices, changing practices. It is in this sense that there is a discourse 
that is installed as a social imaginary through which symbolic efficacy is acquired. 
These values have an imaginary efficiency because as stated above, they are 
detached from the real conditions of its existence. 
The democratic discourse sets the meanings that define democracy be-
yond their actual accomplishments within democratic practice. It is this constitu-
tive impossibility of the democratic functioning what implies the reproduction of 
the relations of domination and constitutes ideology. Ideology reproduces social 
reality as relations of domination; it is in that sense that, as Jameson explains, “the 
ideological dimension is intrinsically embedded within the reality, which secretes 
it as a necessary feature of its own structure. That dimension is thus profoundly 
imaginary in a real and positive sense; that is to say, it exists and is real in so far 
as it is an image, marked and destined to remain as such, its very unreality and 
unrealizability being what is real about it” (Jameson in Zizek, 1994: 280). 
The ideological dimension of the democratic functioning can be understood 
as a structural movement whereby the real possibilities of attaining social reality 
are disavowed by a hegemonic circulation of a concept, hegemonic in the sense 
(Gramsci) that it reproduces dominant ideas by using this paradox. In other 
words, it presents what it should be achieved and the ideological mechanism 
that discards this possibility lays in this presentation. This ideological movement 
can be understood through the logic of circulation of commodities. In words of 
Celso Furtado, as an organised fantasy.
The hegemony of a concept is replaced by another carrying the unachieved 
promises of the previous one, and this can be seen in the shift occurred from 
development to democracy, as the main pillar of social thinking, and in some 
cases of social sinking as well.
For Carlos D. González Torres: “The complex results of the social engineer-
ing, omitting every reference to their real purposes, are originated and structured 
with the external financing, the political and academic merger and corruption. 
The objective or teleology of a capitalist sociopolitical technology is not ensur-
ing ‘freedom’ and achieving ‘progress’ or ‘democracy’. By using a very general 
term, there is a concealment of a political mimesis that omits any reference to 
its real objective: contributing to the stability of capitalism. The use of the term 
tries to represent a meaning as a ‘political symbol’ of the bourgeois social order. 
The implementation of the ‘political symbol’ tries to explain, by itself, the alleged 
purposes of the projects they identify, encouraging the promotion of a complete 
redefinition of social sciences concepts which contribute to rule out the solutions 
suggested by the progressive and Marxist thought. Thus, the image of capitalism 
‘as a society with no alternative’ is consolidated (Frank Hinkelammert). The teleol-
ogy that offers, by means of ‘political symbols’, the social conservative reflection, 
tries to place itself above every ‘classist’ approach by encouraging a ‘neutral’ or 
‘apolitical’ treatment with respect to any manifestation of social conflict. (Reflex-
iones sobre la ‘Transición democrática’” (González Torres, 2001: 205) 
If we understand that democracy is installed as a hegemonic discourse, 
this implies that there are certain relations of domination that are exercised 
through consent, and consent within democracy is placed and exhausted in the 
mechanism of election, or in a wide sense, in the legal framework that defines 
liberal democracy.
Besides the legal framework that constrains the extension of politics, the 
ideological function of democracy also displays another series of strategies that 
subjects the individual to the rule of democracy, and therefore, to the distance 
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that divides democratic aims and meanings, on the one hand, from democratic 
accomplishments and practice, on the other hand
Within liberal democracy, this ideological distance is set as a step to be 
taken, as a task to be completed and in this sense it denies the very logic of 
its functioning. Ideology itself is presented and understood as lying outside the 
democratic paradigm, which is set as a universal truth.
This also implies avoiding the structural dimension that inclusion takes in 
the democratic practice, in the sense previously exposed: that is, allowing dif-
ferent discourses, as well as the discourse of difference, to circulate globally and 
democratically, avoiding, therefore, the point whereby ‘difference‘ is reproduced 
as inequality. Slavoj Zizek radically opposes the political correctness within de-
mocracy by relating it to a strategy of inclusion of everything but critique: “Indeed, 
since the ‘normal’ functioning of capitalism involves some kind of disavowal of 
the basic principle of its functioning (today’s model capitalist is someone who, 
after ruthlessly generating profit, then generously shares parts of it, giving large 
donations to churches, victims of ethnic or sexual abuse, etc., posing as hu-
manitarian), the ultimate act of transgression is to assert this principle directly, 
depriving it of its humanitarian mask. I am therefore tempted to reverse Marx’s 
Thesis 11: the first task today is precisely not to succumb to the temptation to 
act, to intervene directly and change things (which then inevitably ends in a cul-
de-sac of debilitating impossibility: ‘What can we do against global capital?’), 
but to question the hegemonic ideological co-ordinates” (Zizek, 2002: 169).
In that sense it could be argued that the problem is still attached to an 
idealist (ideological?) point of view because it does not take into account the 
problem regarding the relations of production. So the solutions proposed by 
both sides, and besides the question on the preeminence or not of the nation 
state, are subject to the same criticisms that Marx has already made to the 
Proudhonist. As Jameson puts it, comparing the Proudhonist with the political 
realism: “It is a question of the attitude of the Proudhonist to this reversal, and 
of their miscomprehension of the ideological dimension of the exchange system 
and how that functions -both true and false, both objective and delusional” 
(Jameson in Zizek, 2000: 279).
A retrospective regard of the subjects developed here, puts the accent on 
the question formulated by Lenin and quoted at the beginning of this section. 
The actuality of the answer provided by him in terms that might not appear 
appropriate within the frames of the political correctness proves to reveal the 
current sate of things: “By slandering the people- the old but eternally new 
method of the bourgeoisie” (Lenin in Zizek, 2002: 28).
Critique as radical politics
“Radical es aquel que va a la raíz. 
A la raíz va el hombre verdadero” 
(José Martí)
Considering that the functioning of democracy sets the limits for what is to be 
allowed or disallowed, and legitimates this frame by a consensus ideologically 
installed by the democratic discourse, I believe that critique should open the 
possibilities of politics to transcend the hegemony of certain historical relations 
presented as universal truths. 
I argue that the mechanism displayed by the ideological operation has 
its raison d´etre in the unfeasibility of politics. This unfeasibility is attained in the 
ideological functioning by setting (and therefore controlling) the extent to, and 
the way whereby politics are to be exercised. The essence of politics, as the 
capability of contestation to power, is withheld within democratic discourse 
because the hegemony of democracy implies the legitimacy of the means 
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(and meanings) that install the democratic function. This entails that the extent 
to which politics can contest the given structures of power are set within the 
democratic rules. 
Critique in political sense emerges to cover the existing gap that sustains 
the democratic functioning and, in that sense, it can be argued that critique 
has a reflexive movement towards its object: its process of abstraction from 
the object of experience (in this case, the democratic functioning) points to re-
present the historical system that allows this object of experience to emerge 
as truth. Therefore, relations of domination within a given system of power are 
consolidated. In the current situation of social and political hegemony, it can be 
argued that this relation of reflection that sustains critique has been replaced in 
the main stream theory and academy for a Dorian Gray model2, that is to say: no 
reflection has been allowed, there is no return from the object of experience to 
the object of knowledge. The object of knowledge is trapped in the consistence 
of its own image. The financial illusion reproduces this movement and it is from 
this illusion that a continuous process of capital accumulation takes place despite 
thousands of people. If we are able to reveal the false image of the portrait, then, 
the social relation that supports it will be weakened. It is important to challenge 
supremacy and anything presented as “state of things”. This is also a battle of 
consciousness, and a battle for words to be recovered, as exemplified by the 
case of hegemony of the liberal concept of democracy.
It is in this sense that critique should tend to point out that “actuality is not 
the vessel into which thought empties itself, although it is this striving towards 
the unity of thought and actuality that gives philosophy its raison d’ etre. This 
aporia must not be abandoned, but continually practiced and revived through 
negative dialectics. Adorno himself names his critique one of ‘dissonance’. It is 
the dissonance between thought and actuality, concept and object, identity and 
non-identity that must be revealed. The task of the critic is to illuminate those 
cracks in the totality, those fissures in the social net, those moments of dishar-
mony and discrepancy, through which the untruth of the whole is revealed and 
glimmers of another life become visible” (Benhabib in Zizek, 2000:87-88)
The exercise of critique implies that truth arises less from ontology than 
from a genealogy, understood as “the account for the constitution of the subject 
within a historical framework” (Foucault in Gordon, 1980: 17). Nevertheless, 
critique as political critique needs to shift this analytical proposal from the quite 
individualistic level in which Foucault places it to a collective level, where the 
concept of politics lies. 
If we consider hegemony as a power factor, it becomes clear that critique 
should tend to reveal the mechanisms whereby hegemony rules social reality, 
displaying meanings that sustain a given order. It is in this sense that theory 
can contribute to the development of dissonant perspectives that might allow 
change to emerge. 
This revelation needs to be a radical one in order to avoid the trap of be-
ing integrated to the all–inclusive logic of capitalism. I would say that, because 
the current social and economical situation of the people in the world is one of 
radical poverty and exclusion, it is necessary to maintain radicalism as opposed 
to mediocrity. Radicalism needs to be an attitude towards the halfway solutions 
offered and organized by the establishment to maintain the status quo.
The search for the structures and mechanisms that produce and repro-
duce hegemonic relations lies at the heart of the critical approach. Therefore, a 
political critique must tend to develop an understanding of social phenomena, 
not as empirical facts that will reveal a hidden truth, but as the revelation of a re-
2   I should thank Professor John Saxe Fernandez for the Dorian Gray metaphor.
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lationship system leading to the comprehension of the hegemonic functioning of 
democracy. The capacity to apprehend the mechanisms that install hegemonic 
practices will lead, in turn, to the development of the possibilities of change. 
As Cristodoulodis explains: “Political freedom ultimately lies in the freedom 
to contest the meaning of political conflict, action and collective or communal 
identity” (Christodoulidis, 1998: 68). This implies the aim of allowing change to 
emerge by a continuous practice of interpellation.
This fact has lead to the notion of politics as the possibility of exercising 
critique and, in this sense politics will imply the possibility to transcend the way 
in which democracy is structured into the symbolic field of society and, at the 
same time, to allow the imaginary registry to be permeated by the gap created in 
the symbolic field. This will constitute the mechanisms that continually re-create 
democratic practices within the paradigm of critique and thus, hegemony will 
be contested.
It is necessary to point to a radical theory that should include critique as a 
tool for social change. If critique is taken as a continuous practice, this criticism 
might be replied from the possibility of a non finished process of interpellation 
to any practice taken as hegemonic: “It is in the state of tension between dif-
ferent realized ideas an practices on the one hand, and alternatives to these on 
the other that it becomes possible to avoid getting caught by established ideas 
and institutions” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979; Marcuse, 1964). By negating 
the existing order, it becomes possible to see in a different and seminal way” 
(Alvesson et al., 2003: 138).
Radicalism needs to recover the sense of tragedy to avoid the repetition of 
history as a comedy (in the sense pointed by Marx that history happens twice); 
this sense implies illusion, will, and pain, as a deep compromise to ourselves, 
in order to avoid getting caught in nihilism, conformism or mediocrity. These 
are the ways that ideology offers, concealed in a variety of theories deployed 
by academy. 
Radical critique also needs to revive poetry as deepness, as what lies at 
the heart of the search, because art, as politics, needs to be detached from 
the market, and the sublime needs to be recovered and disengaged from the 
banality of consumption strategies.
Susan Bucks Morss poses it in this way: “What if every time that the 
consciousness of individuals surpassed the confines of present constellations 
of power in perceiving the concrete meaning of freedom, this were valued as 
a moment, however transitory, of the realization of absolute spirit?. What other 
silences would need to be broken? What un- disciplined stories would be told? 
(Buck Morss, 2005: 234)
In this sense, it is important to introduce the notion of modernity as a 
non-concluded process and, therefore, rescue the necessity of a project as 
the recovery of utopia beyond the limits of what is set as possible. This is also 
the sense of tragedy, as stated above, against the uncompromised ways of 
postmodernism. 
Critique needs to cope with the insistence of the residues and the ex-
cluded, pointing to what the really existing world is in its links and structural 
determinants.
As Enrique Rodríguez Larreta wonders : “La construction de modernités 
alternatives est-elle possible (Taylor, 2004) dans un monde dominé para des 
hégémonies impériales, avec des régions entières dévastés para la guerre et 
par le somnambulisme de l´anomie, parmi des îles de prospérité et de richesse ? 
Ou bien devons- nous accepter les stimulants narcotiques de la philosophie 
gothique, en regardant par la fenêtre de notre hôtel de l´abîme avant que ses 
murs ne s´écroulent ? Voici un des défis de ce nouveau siècle : la construction 
de nouveaux langages qui conduisent á de nouveaux langages qui conduisent 
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á de nouvelles pratiques pour un changement de nos sociétés. Les succès 
éphémères de nombreuses révolutions et leurs coûts humains énormes nous 
préserveront peut-être du recours simpliste a la révolution, ce mot d´ordre d´un 
XXéme siècle qui s´éloigne déjà et nous oblige a penser sérieusement aux 
conditions spécifiques de transformations qui demeurent indispensables dans 
l´ensemble du monde eu qui vont exiger l´imagination et la participation de 
bien des voix et de bien des perspectives aujourd’hui oubliées et englouties” 
(Rodríguez Larreta, 2005: 167).
Conclusion
This paper is originated in the current paradox of a progressively productive 
world and, at the same time, increasingly poor due to a concentration process 
that leaves behind any attempt of change. “Globalisation and democratisation 
were one side of the general process. Concentration of the production and of 
the income, centralization of capital, unemployment and social exclusion, were 
the other” (Theotonio Dos Santos, Johannesburg)
I argue that hegemony in this world has been set as the complete control 
and domination of social forces. Alienation has the form of consumption, as 
an efficient sell of illusion that has installed what Guy Debord once called the 
society of spectacle, where everything that is desirable is brilliant on the stage 
despite the darkness of every day life, submitted to the logic of commodities, 
and slaved to accumulation. 
In this context, political life has become part of the spectacle and democ-
racy has been deployed everywhere as the political solution. It is actually pre-
sented as a desirable goal as long as it is understood as liberal democracy. The 
liberal democratic order frames the expansion of financial capital by disavowing 
the emergence of politics, by setting the means to control critique, making it 
functional to the requirements of capitalism. Even if sometimes it is self evident 
that discourses are detached from their social reality, the illusion remains and is 
reproduced in the various channels of the system, including academy and even 
critical theory, often regarded isolated in the so called cultural studies, as an 
apartheid of criticism from the classical disciplines, which are also, by the way, the 
ones taken into account when considering decision making jobs or places.
It is in that sense that I pointed out the necessity of reviving politics as a 
radical position, as opposed to the softness of functional thinking. Critique should 
be ceaseless, accurate and radical to avoid being integrated to the logic of circula-
tion that rules financial capitalism, and should set means and ends as a project 
of emancipation from a perspective that reintroduces passion as humanity.
As an appendix, I will consider the Paraguayan situation from the viewpoint 
of the theory previously exposed.
Appendix: The Paraguayan situation.
Here, I would like to introduce the case of Paraguay as to present an empirical 
evidence of how democracy can work as hegemonic political discourse.
Paraguay has a recent political history of authoritarianism deeply rooted 
in the social function. The inauguration of the democratic period was state-led 
and conducted by people who had, during the 35 years of dictatorship, an ac-
tive participation in the regime. 
The independent political life of Paraguay started in 1811, after breaking 
out the Spanish colonial rule and it has been marked from the beginning by the 
succession of different types of government, from a triumvirate to a more liberal 
government with a consolidated economy, that lasted until the bloody war of 
the Triple Alianza (1875-1870) in which the country fought against Argentina, 
Brazil and Uruguay.
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“In the Triple Alianza war, little was missed to complete exterminate Para-
guay. The population that was over 1.300.000 inhabitants before the conflict, 
was reduced to 200.000 people, from which approximately 10 per cent were 
men, and in its majority children, elderly people and foreigners” (Vasconcellos, 
1974: 85). The territory was reduced and the political life was under control of 
Brazil and Argentina.
After the war, the process of political reorganization meant the conforma-
tion of a more liberal and institutional political life, with the creation of the two 
main political parties, the Colorado party and the Liberal party as well as other 
institutions. Nevertheless, the Paraguayan economy never recovered from this 
war, and until today industrialization and modernisation of the productive struc-
tures have not taken place at a significative level.
The beginning of the XX century was marked by a political instability, 
which was to last until the war held between Paraguay and Bolivia, known as 
the Chaco war (1932-1935).
Even though the Chaco war is considered to have consolidated a Para-
guayan national identity, the period that followed it was characterized by political 
turmoil and a cruel civil war, in 1947, between the Colorados and an alliance of 
several parties, including the Liberales, Febreristas and Communists, a conflict 
whose latest aftermaths resulted in the rise and government of the General 
Alfredo Stroessner in 1954, a member of the Colorado Party and the Army.
From 1954 to 1989, Stroessner ruled the country. I will now draw on the 
consequences that the 34 years of dictatorship had and continue to have in 
Paraguayan political and social life.
To understand the so-called democratic transition in Paraguay, it is nec-
essary to look backwards to the structures that Stroessner’s era built up and 
left. This will allow visualizing and highlighting which factors function in the 
democratic Paraguayan practice.
The complete military support and the backing of the Colorado Party, as 
well as a foreign policy respondent to the anticommunist principle of Washington 
meant a very narrow frame for political and social change inside the Stroessnian 
model. The level of social control exercised by this powerful political articulation 
–the US support, the Government, the Colorado Party and the Army– gave 
the dictatorship a wide margin of action well consolidated on the basis of the 
precedent political instability and the promise of peace and progress.
Stroessner’s policies implemented social control, which was the basis of 
the very structure of the regime design. This represented, on the one hand, the 
complete cooptation of the state apparatuses and the control of the Army; and 
the repressive use of force in a selective way, on the other. Thus, the authoritar-
ian machinery knew, even when reaching peaks of social repression, how to 
maintain a bearable tension at the social level, since the factors of disturbance 
were very well controlled through the development of works of infrastructure, the 
expansion of the agriculture frontier and the migration process to Argentina.
The period from 1962-1977 was the axis that permitted the model to ex-
pand itself until the end of the eighties. “This is the phase of the greater splendor 
of General Alfredo Stroessner’s regime. Its political legitimacy came from the 
addition of a considerable part of the opposition to the political system, the ab-
sence of pressures in the international sphere, the economical consolidation with 
important works of infrastructure and in the seventies, the boom produced by the 
construction of the Itaipu hydroelectric dam and the distribution of state owned 
lands that decompressed the tensions in the rural area” (Arditi, 1992: 28).
The modernization boosted by Stroessner amd supported by the help of 
the United States, meant for the population an important growth in the amount of 
infrastructure, bridges, roads, schools and public services. Nevertheless, these 
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facts must be seen through the filter of a corrupt public administration that acted 
as a core to which the different elements of modernization were being added.
The privileged context of the resources originated from Itaipu, the inter-
national market for the soy and cotton, as well as the support of the foreign 
powers started to decay around 1985. The former privileged joint could not be 
transformed into a more or less permanent economic structure because “the 
state was not able to combine growth with development or to set an equilibrated 
economy, and it became a source of generalized corruption. The country could 
not enter a phase of industrialization. At the beginning of the eighties, 4 of ev-
ery 5 enterprises had less than 4 employees and almost half of the employees 
(44,7%) had no remuneration at all. The index of installed capacity unemployed 
was of 40 to 50% in 1984” (OMora,1993: 103).
 In 1987, the national Colorado Party Convention marked the existing 
differences inside the political elites. The division between Traditionalists and 
Militants meant the fall of Stroessner, though not of the Colorado Party, who 
knew how to manage the demands that would ensure the continuity in power 
and how to manage this continuity as a political strategy.
It is in this sense that what has been called transition to democracy was 
initiated and conducted by old elements constitutive of the dictatorship, and now 
accommodated to the new discursive exigencies of the political momentum.
“In general, in the final phase of the Stroessnian regime, there was a grow-
ing consensus at least in one issue, that the overcome of a state of things which 
morphology was imminently political was related to the democratic question” 
(Arditi, 1992: 67).
“In the tradition of the democratic thinking, democracy is understood as a 
political regime opposed to oligarchy, that is to say, a government of minorities. 
Now, if the representative democracy points to a collective well being and its rep-
resentatives are compromised to secure the liberties and equalities of the citizens, 
how can it be understood that the democratic idealism that the representatives of 
the people say to profess is depriving the majority of the Paraguayan population 
of the minimum necessary for their subsistence?” (Lara Castro, 2003). 
This question provides the shift to inquire the Paraguayan democratic 
process and demonstrates that the current situation is rooted before 1989 and 
the coup d’etat that took Stroessner from power. 
I consider that one of the particular elements of this case is the fact that 
in Paraguay there has been a transition to democracy instead of a democratic 
transition, and this means a discourse of democracy that acts as a promise, 
detached from its social and historical process. This is a fundamental factor 
in the Paraguayan case that converges in the maintenance, at a low cost, of 
the pre-existing situation of distribution and political functioning. As Jorge Lara 
Castro (2003) puts it: “It is a successful model”, in the sense that it works per-
fectly and reproduces itself beyond the eloquence of its social failures. This state 
of things meant, once the democratic period was open in 1989, a concealed 
continuation of the former situation under the title of democracy, accompanied 
by deterioration in the economy figures.
Under this state of things, democracy has proved its hegemony, with a 
gradual growth in electoral participation, as well as with the improving of the 
vote mechanisms in terms of accountability and transparency. At the same time, 
there has been a growing institutionalization and a legal reform that assures 
the democratic rule.
This poses the question of to what extent law allows social conflict to ap-
pear, as Christodoulidis (1996) points out, law “by allowing only certain conflict 
to register, it is not containing but instead selectively privileging and suppressing. 
And if that is so, then our legal democracy, is prejudicial and deaf to genuine 
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aspirations expressed in civil society – aspirations which are manifest in political 
conflict but not in legal argument”.
In the abovementioned context, the way out is presented as the deepening 
of the democratic practice in the terms already set out in the formal agenda of 
democracy, though there are several factors, which I consider constitutive rather 
than functional, that guarantee that democratic practice should remain where it 
is, with an occasional concession related to the establishment of a more perfect 
legal framework. The beginning of democracy in Paraguay meant as well the 
disarticulation of the political forces, who were mainly engaged in democratic 
discourse, abandoning its former position of contestation and rejoining together 
in democratic discourse.
I consider that the Paraguayan case offers a clear picture of the way the 
democratic discourse operates as a doctrine for political development rather 
than as a social historical process. At the same time, it means that the historical 
process is hidden by a formal discourse operating at the imaginary level. Susan 
Marks exposes clearly this ideological functioning by asserting that “a third set 
of ideological strategies legitimates low intensity democracy by means of an 
imaginary resolution of social and political antagonisms. Through strategies 
of unification the various cleavages around which relations of domination are 
articulated are made to seem non-existent, with the consequence that efforts to 
transform those relations come to appear unnecessary […] The universalisation of 
civil and political rights thus serves to confer an illusory wholeness on the divided 
social body, universal suffrage, together with universal civil rights, appear as the 
hallmarks of political institutions that are impartial and inclusory. The gap between 
low intensity democracy and popular democracy is imaginatively closed. In this 
way, societies engaged in democratic reconstruction are encouraged to start by 
putting in place certain institutions and constitutional guarantees, and leave for 
later questions about how to provide the conditions in which those guarantees 
can be made meaningful for all citizens” (Marks, 2000: 65).
The ideological function opens up a gap between an installed imaginary 
register and the current symbolic practices that result from this imaginary. The 
plus, understood as what is left in this operation, is the very essence of the 
social reality and is also what constitutes the object of knowledge, becoming, 
therefore, the object of power itself.
This leads to the search of critique in the sense pointed by Christodoloudis 
(1998) of “re-politicise all the assumptions behind conflict, action and identity 
that the law takes for granted. What is ‘stilled’ by law here becomes contested 
terrain again, and as such, political”.
In this context, Paraguay still has to face several issues related to its posi-
tion in the world system, the privatisation of the public services being the first 
point of agenda. Given the disappointing results of these operations in neigh-
bouring countries, especially Argentina and its neo liberal boom, the question 
immediately arises as to whether the democratic order is something else than 
a politic strategy imposed by the international in order to establish a formal and 
legal frame of legitimisation of control. It is a kind of subjectivation of the power 
and domination structures.
For a country whose economy is based in the informal market and in the 
extraction of natural resources, with a minimal cultural development, the future 
situation appears quite blurred. Nonetheless, the democratic mechanism has 
already been set and has the health of a ten year-old baby to cope with the 
growing gap that situates the country in the international order. 
I do not want to understand the Paraguayan process in terms of its particu-
larity, but in terms of the strategies previously described. I consider that, despite 
the singularities of any process, democracy as a hegemonic contemporary politi-
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cal discourse efficiently sets the means for capitalism to develop and this implies 
straight away the deepening of the social and political crisis in the world.
Within crisis, I argue, it is important to assert the necessity of conflict as 
the emergence of the contradictions that sustain and reproduce a given state 
of things, and political critique is set to be an essential tool in this struggle.
The purpose of this paper was to show that the way in which the histori-
cal facts, that shape the Paraguayan political and social situation, have been 
integrated to the logic of the democratic function has contributed not only to 
worsen the already critical economical and social situation but also to bring 
about a general passivity through contemplative attitude towards the current 
situation. At the same time, democracy is installed as the political option with 
the concurrent exhaustion of developing politics as contestation. In that sense, 
and in what might be considered as a prescription, I understand the necessity 
of developing and reinforcing social critique in a level that should situate Para-
guay in its particularity, as part of the unity of the capitalist mode of production 
in its financial stage.
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